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Abstract 
Why do large firms in Japan hold small percentages of stock in trading partners? A 
firm that holds stock in a trading partner weakens its own bargaining position, for a 
portion of its own gain from trade then includes a share interest in the partner's 
gain from trade. But precisely for this reason the firm can at any time penalize the 
trading partner by divesting its share interest. Cross-shareholding therefore 
strengthens the penalties for opportunism and this may be its purpose. Opportunism 
here means substituting products of lower quality than claimed or misrepresenting 
investments that lower the other party's costs. Econometric analysis of the pattern 
of cross-shareholding within Japan's keiretsu groups in 1980 reveals evidence that is 
consistent with this argument. (J.E.L. classifications: D23, G30, L14) 
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this project. Also, for comments on earlier drafts of this paper I thank Karen Chen, 
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THE KEIRETSU PUZZLE 
1. Introduction, 
One of the most puzzling features of Japanese business is the prevalence of small 
shareholding ties (5% of stock or less) between large firms that are trading partners. 
These shareholding ties are most prominent in the keiretsu, the six major business 
groups that include most of the largest companies in Japan.1 For instance 27.4% of 
the outstanding shares of the 25 companies that were affiliated with the presidents' 
club of the Mitsubishi group in 1988 were held inside the same group. The average 
stockholding of each of the 21 nonfinancial members of the presidents' club in each of 
the others was about 1% in 1980.2 Similar statements could be made about the 
presidents' clubs of the Mitsui, Fuyo, Sumitomo, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi Kangyo keiretsu. 
Why do the members of Japan's keiretsu hold small amounts of one another's stock? 
This is the keiretsu puzzle. 
None of the proposed theories of keiretsu cross-shareholding is entirely 
satisfactory. These include (1) the anti-takeover theory, (2) the externality theory, 
and (3) the successive monopoly theory. In the anti-takeover theory it is argued that 
the shareholding interlocks are to make takeovers less likely, either to insulate 
managers from disciplining by shareholders (Odagiri, 1975; Kobayashi, 1980; Aoki, 
*The word "keiretsu" means "affiliates" and is applied to two kinds of business 
groups in Japan besides the six so-called "financial keiretsu" to which I refer here. 
There are also "distribution keiretsu" consisting of a manufacturing firm (Matsushita, 
Shiseido, Nikon) and its family of wholesalers and retailers bound to one another by 
contractual agreements, and "enterprise keiretsu" which comprise a large manufacturing 
firm (Nippon Steel Co., Toyota, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) and its myriad subsidiaries 
and subcontractors. 
2Banks and other financial institutions, although limited by Japan's antimonopoly 
laws from holding more than 10% of the stock in any one company have in fact been the 
biggest shareholders in the keiretsu (The limit was lowered to 5% for banks as of 1987). 
The burgeoning literature on the "main bank" system of Japan develops the argument that 
shareholding by keiretsu financial institutions lowers the costs of their intermediation 
by resolving agency problems. Flath (1984), Hodder and Tshoegel (1985), Sheard (1989), 
Prowse (1990), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), and Flath (1993), all emphasize 
the economic advantages of banks' holding of stock in clients. But these arguments shed 
almost no light on the shareholding ties that link nonfinancial firms. 
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1984), or else to prevent hostile stock raiders from abrogating a firm's long-term 
contracts (Ramseyer, 1987; Aoki, 1987; Sheard, 1991). The anti-takeover theory is a 
leading theory of keiretsu cross-shareholding largely because of the extreme 
infrequency in Japan of hostile takeovers. Because takeovers are so rare the notion 
is widely held that takeover defenses have been effective, and cross-shareholding has 
appeared to many to be such a defense. But it is far from obvious that cross-
shareholding in fact is an effective takeover defense; why should institutional 
shareholders be any less reluctant than other shareholders to tender their shares in 
the event of an enriching bid? Perhaps takeovers have been rare in Japan not because 
defenses are effective but because the potential gains from successful takeovers are 
small. At the least, validation of the anti-takeover theory of cross-shareholding 
awaits further empirical investigation, for instance relating the pattern of cross-
shareholding to the likelihood of hostile takeover bids and to cross-shareholdings' 
relative effectiveness as a takeover defense. 
In the externality theory, firms affiliate with one another in order to 
internalize the gains from activities with potential spillover effects. For instance 
if advertising by one firm benefits other firms that have its same trademark, then 
this very fact both induces firms to establish common trademarks with other firms and 
to hold shares in the other firms (Hadley, 1970; pp. 247-8, 253-4). Besides 
advertising, the activity with spillovers could be research and development or the 
collection and dissemination of information (Goto, 1982). 
In the successive monopoly theory, firms that have market power and are trading 
partners establish share interlocks to induce one another to set prices or orders for 
production that are in their common interest as opposed to one's selfish interest 
(Caves and Uekusa, 1976; Fung, 1991). It is clear that shareholding ties have the 
potential of aligning the interests of successive monopolists (See Flath (1989) for an 
algebraic example). But the problem with this as an explanation for the shareholding 
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interlocks observed in the keiretsu is that the interlocks are quite small. Often as 
little as 1% of a company's stock is held by any one other company, and the average 
level of cross-shareholding in fellow group members is also small. If the purpose of 
the cross-shareholding is the integration of successive monopolies, then why is the 
cross-shareholding so limited in extent? This is also a problem for the externality 
theory: How could small shareholdings result in any significant alignment of interests 
or capture of spillovers? 
Perhaps, after all, the keiretsu cross-shareholding is merely symbolic, its point 
being to signal the existence of an ongoing business relation between companies. If 
this is so then the size of the shareholding is not important so long as it passes 
some threshold of observability which may be quite small. For it is not the 
shareholding itself but the relationship which it signals that alters the calculations 
of the firm, its rivals, customers, or suppliers. Yamamura (1979) comes close to 
arguing this. And Imai (1990), in fact uses the very word "symbolic" (p. 172) in 
describing the keiretsu cross-shareholding. So does Gerlach (1987, p. 131). 
It is my contention that cross-shareholding between nonfinancial firms that are 
trading partners does in fact serye an economic purpose, that it is not merely 
symbolic. The economic purpose is that it deters opportunistic behavior. Holding 
stock in a trading partner slants the bargaining over product market variables in 
favor of the trading partner. Divesting such a stock interest accomplishes the 
reverse. The firm that holds shares in a trading partner can credibly threaten to 
divest should the trading partner behave opportunistically, withdrawing from it the 
bargaining advantage that the equity position had conferred. In this manner a firm 
may establish a partial equity position in a trading partner to deter opportunism. 
Gilson and Roe (1993) make rather similar claims to these in passing (See in 
particular pp. 885-7 and p. 900 of their paper), but they do not develop the argument 
in detail nor confront it with empirical evidence. In another related paper, Berglof 
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and Perotti (1994) develop a model in which a coalition of a firm's trading partner's 
maintain a controlling share interest and act directly to forestall opportunism. In 
my argument, one trading partner of a firm deters opportunism towards itself by 
maintaining a silent financial interest which it threatens to divest if it is ever 
deceived. 
Evidence that I will present supports the view that keiretsu cross-shareholding 
deters opportunism. Equity links are greater between keiretsu firms that by virtue of 
the industries to which they belong are likely to be trading partners. Also equity 
links are greater where opportunism is less deterred by the mere loss of reputation 
with the trading partner. 
In developing my argument I propose a model of share trading and product market 
choices in a bilateral monopoly. The share trades are made through an efficient stock 
market, one in which share prices reflect a correct anticipation of product market 
outcomes. The product market outcomes fulfill the Nash bargaining solution. 
2. Cross-Shareholding, Bargaining, and Opportunism. 
2.1. basic framework. 
The model envisions a sequence of actions by two firms that are bilateral 
monopolists. First, each firm either purchases or divests shares in the other in an 
efficient stock market, or receives shares as a sidepayment from the other. If a firm 
receives shares as a sidepayment it then either sells the shares, holds them or 
acquires more shares in an efficient stock market. In the second stage, the firms 
agree on the product price. In the third stage, each firm takes some action that is 
hidden from the other but which determines the upstream firm's cost of supplying the 
downstream firm and determines the quality of the product to be exchanged (about which 
more, shortly.) Finally, the product is exchanged, and each firm now learns what 
hidden actions were taken by the other, but these inferences are not verifiable by a 
third party. The process just described is repetitive. That is after producing and 
exchanging output, the firms once again undertake stock market transactions, then 
agree to a new product price, again take some hidden actions that affect the costs of 
producing or the quality of the product, consummate the exchange of product and infer 
the nature of one another's hidden actions, etc. The sequence of events is described 
in figure 1. 
Figure 1. Sequence of events. 
> 1 2 
The main conclusion I wish to draw from this model is that either firm may 
continue to hold a partial equity interest in the other, to bond that other to take 
hidden actions which are Pareto optimal. The shareholding biases the bargaining over 
product market variables in favor of the firm in which shares are held. The credible 
threat of divesting such share interest in the event of dissatisfaction with earlier 
actions deters the firm in which the shares are held from acting opportunistically or 
in a deceitful manner. 
2.2. share trading in an efficient stock market. 
In analyzing the model it is useful to first have in mind the general properties 
of share trading in an efficient stock market. Here "the stock market is efficient" 
means that the price at which shares are traded reflects a correct anticipation of the 
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effects of the trader's change in shareholding position on product market outcomes, 
Let Zi denote the discounted present value of firm i's operating earnings that depend 
on its trade with j. So, for example, if trade with another party is an alternative 
to trade with j then Z1 represents the difference in i's operating earnings if it 
trades with j rather than with that other party. Denote by 8, c (0,1], firm i's 
shareholding in firm j. 
If the level of shareholding is unchanging then the present equity value of firm 
i is 
the present value of its own operating earnings that depend on trade with j: (ZJ; 
plus the present value of assets unrelated to j: (m.,); plus the value of its share 
interest in firm j: (5-jUj). 
Should firm 1 acquire more shareholdings or divest its shareholdings in firm 2 
and the stock market is efficient, it would have to expend an amount or would realize 
an amount that equals the pro-rata ex-post equity value of firm 2. Let superscript 
"0" denote an ex-ante (pre- share trading) value and superscript "1" an ex-post value. 
In the simple case in which firm 2 itself owns no shares in firm 1, stock market 
efficiency would mean that firm 1 must expend an amount in 
altering its share interest from 5° to 6* (Here we have m^mg because share-trading 
has by definition no bearing on the value of either firm's non-trade-dependent assets 
m.,, i=l,2). And the ex-post equity value of firm 1 will be But 
Stock market transactions 
only affect the equity value of the firm either by altering the present value of its 
own trade-dependent operating earnings stream 1\ or by altering the market value of 
the firm's original shareholding in the other firm's trade-dependent operating 
earnings ^l\. This remains true in the slightly more general case in which 
shareholding is reciprocal so that indirect shareholding ties augment direct ones, as 
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expressed in the following. 
Lemma. If the stock market is efficient and if initially firm i holds 8° shares in 
firm j and firm j holds 8° shares in i, then the equity value of firm i ex-post any 
permanent change in either firm's shareholdings is 
Proof. The ex-post equity value of each firm where Af 
represents i's cash outlays for shares. Stock market efficiency requires that 
Af=(6*-6°)Uj. Consequently, Simultaneous solution of this 
pair of equations yields the lemma. 
O 
The objective of each firm i with regard to its share trading is to maximize U* as 
defined in the lemma. 
2.3. product market, Nash bargaining solution. 
In considering bargaining between the two firms regarding product price and other 
product market variables, it is useful to define the portion of each firm's equity 
value that depends upon its trade with the other. From (1), the expressions defining 
firm equity values are 
If we solve these simultaneously, we obtain 
Recall that Z., is defined as the portion of i's operating earnings that depend on 
trade with j. Consequently, the first term in the above expression—call it 7ri? which 
consolidates all the terms that include Z-j or Zd, represents the portion of the equity 
value of each firm i that depends on trade with the other, whether directly or through 
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its share interest in the other: 
In other words, ^1 represents firm i's quasi-rent in it's product market dealings with 
firm j. The goal of each firm i in its bargaining with the other is to maximize its 
quasi-rent 7ri so that it will have maximized U ^ 
I shall maintain that the product market variables fulfill the Nash bargaining 
solution. Under the Nash cooperative solution, the bargaining payoffs of the two 
firms are equal to one another n1^nzi which from equation (3) requires that 
(1-5JZ 2 (4) Z1 = - — , 
(l-«z) 
and the output is such as to maximize the combined payoffs of the two firms 7r1+7r2. 
Notice that if 7r1=7r2, then from equations (3) and (4) we have 
For given cross-shareholding, maximizing 7r1+7T2 is thus equivalent to maximizing Z2+Z2. 
And if share trading has no effect on the combined (trade-dependent) operating 
earnings of the firms Z2+Z2, then the firm that has the smaller share stake realizes 
greater bargaining rent. This implies the following. 
Proposition 1. If the present value of the combined trade-dependent earnings of the 
firms is invariant with the configuration of cross-shareholding, and the product 
market variables are determined according to the Nash bargaining solution, and if 
equity shares can be traded in an efficient stock market, then complete divestiture of 
any cross-shareholding is a dominant strategy for both firms. 
Proof. From the lemma and from equation (4), the effect on the equity value of firm 
1, say, of changes in its shareholdings of firm 2 is inverse, whatever the value of 
initial shareholdings 8° and 8%, and whatever the value of ex-post shareholdings 82 
and 82: 
The basis for this proposition is that by divesting a share interest a firm obtains 
resources of equal present value to the divested shares and also unburdens itself of 
an encumbrance on its own earnings. 
Now it has been widely asserted that cross-shareholding inflates the combined 
equity values of firms by a kind of double counting; the value of cross-held shares 
are counted both towards the equity value of the firm that issues them and towards the 
equity value of the firm that holds them (McDonald, 1989; French and Poterba, 1991, p. 
339; Fedenia, Hodder, and Triantis, 1994, pp. 64-5). But in the present context we 
can see that such double counting entails no misevaluation. For if the cross-held 
shares are sold to third parties, the equity value of each firm remains the same as 
before only now the cross-held shares are replaced on the balance sheets of the 
respective firms by the proceeds of the divestiture, assets having in each case 
exactly the same value as the divested shares. 
Cross-shareholding can only persist as an outcome of the model under 
investigation if the premises of Proposition 1 are not fulfilled, that is if cross-
shareholding itself in some way enhances the combined trade-dependent earnings of the 
two firms. I next develop such an example. 
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2.4. cross-shareholding and opportunism. 
As described in equations (3) and (4), stockholding by one of the trading 
partners in the other biases the Nash bargaining over division of rent in favor of the 
target firm--the basis for Proposition 1. For the same reason, if the present value 
of the combined trade-dependent earnings of the firms is invariant with the 
configuration of cross-shareholding, firm l's unilateral divestiture of its stock 
interest S° imposes a capital loss on firm 2: AU2=A7r2. Such capital loss can be 
expressed in relation to firm 2's trade-related quasi-rent n2 using the lemma and 
using equations (3) and (4): 
This expression is made somewhat complicated by the presence of an indirect effect 
which is in practice apt to be minute, firm 2's capital gain on it's own holdings of 
stock in firm 1 should firm 1 divest it's holdings in firm 2. If firm 2 holds no 
shares (S^O) then this effect is not present at all and the relative capital loss to 
firm 2 caused by firm 1 divesting its shares is simply: 
In words, divesting a unilateral stock interest in a trading partner but without 
ending trade, reduces the present value of the partner's future gains from such trade 
by a percentage equal to half the percentage of original shareholding in the partner. 
Because divesting a share interest in a trading partner imposes a capital loss on 
the trading partner, the credible threat of so divesting can be valuable in deterring 
opportunism. Here "opportunism" refers to misrepresenting the extent of one's own 
investment in transaction specific assets. Unless some special measures have been 
arranged in advance a firm may not have adequate ways of penalizing its trading 
partner for such behavior. For instance, it may not be able to credibly threaten to 
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terminate trade altogether, particularly if the opportunism has a relatively small 
impact on rents. In this case, based on the discussion in the previous paragraphs, 
the holding of an equity interest in a trading partner, commensurate with the trading 
partners net gain from such opportunism, serves a useful purpose. Minor acts of 
opportunism can be effectively forestalled bv small shareholdings in trading partners. 
Two separate cases may be identified, one in which the customer holds a partial 
equity interest in the supplier to bond the supplier to faithfully invest in 
transaction specific assets, and the reverse instance in which the supplier holds 
shares in the customer. Consider the first of these.3 Suppose that the value of the 
product to the customer depends upon some investment of the supplier v ^ ) , v'>0, 
v"<0. Suppose further that the investment itself is a hidden action, its level known 
to the supplier at the time it is undertaken but revealed to the customer only after 
consummation of the exchange. Then the price of the product p cannot be made to 
depend on the level of investment except by reliance on the supplier's reputation for 
truthful reporting. Yet the temptation to misreport may be great. If the price is 
set in advance at some fixed level p, and the supplier in choosing his investment 
focuses myopically on his own gain p-c-I^ then he will not invest at all, that is he 
will set I-^O. Let us denote the present value of the perpetual stream of profits 
attained under this regime by the supplier Z2, and by the customer Z 2 (which of course 
vary inversely with the discount rate and positively with the likelihood of trade 
continuing though I shall not introduce parameters describing these relationships). 
Reputation effects will, if strong enough, forestall opportunism and sustain 
Pareto optimal investment. Cross-shareholding strengthens the reputation effects: It 
increases the supplier's future losses that attend the customer's expectation that the 
supplier makes myopic investment choices rather than Pareto optimal ones. The Pareto 
3The algebraic treatment of both examples is based on the discussion of Tirole 
(1988), pp. 24-33. 
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optimal level of investment maximizes v-c-I^ which we may denote by Here 
let us suppose that the customer holds 52 shares in the supplier. They agree upon a 
price p=p such that, if the supplier chooses the Pareto optimal investment, the 
quasirents are divided equally (as in equation (4)). That is p solves: 
where v=v(T1). Will the supplier make the myopic choice IT=0? 
Or will he instead make the Pareto optimal choice I^T^? Let us suppose that at the 
first instance of opportunism (setting I^O), the customer divests its share interest, 
a reasonable presumption in light of Proposition 1. Under this assumption one easily 
calculates the gain to the supplier from choosing I^O rather than perpetually 
maintaining 1^11 as4 
(8) T, - J££(Zl+Z.>, 
2-i>2 
where y is the percent increase in the combined trade-dependent earnings of the two 
firms when the investment level is l ^ J j rather than I^O. It is quite apparent that 
the greater the level of cross-shareholding by the customer the smaller is the gain to 
the supplier of not investing and lying about it. Of course the gain to cheating 
might be less than zero even without cross-shareholding by the customer. For instance 
the gains to cheating are surely negative for some sufficiently low discount rate and 
high probability of trade continuing, which would inflate Zi+Z2> or if growth in trade 
is expected in the future which would also inflate Zi+Z2> the so-called Folk Theorem. 
But where this is not so, cross-shareholding can be decisive in deterring cheating. 
If cross-shareholding is in this manner necessary to the fulfillment of the value 
enhancing stipulation I^Ti, then contrary to the premise of Proposition 1, cross-
shareholding does (indirectly) raise the combined operating earnings of the firms and 
^According to equation (4), Nash bargaining assures that Z1=Z2+62Z1, _so 
Z1=(Z1+Z2)/(2-52).The supplier who cheats, immediately avoids the costs of investing Ix, 
but in subsequent transactions realizes earnings having present value Zi=(Zi+Z2)/2, 
whereas not cheating would have conferred earnings having present value 
0+Y)(Zi+Z2)/(2-62). 
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may persist. Here then is a rationale for the customer to hold a partial equity 
interest in the supplier. Careful application of the lemma and equation (4) 
demonstrates the following. 
Proposition 2. Where the contract enforcing property of the customer's holding of 82 
shares in the supplier raises the present value of combined trade dependent earnings 
of the two firms Z2+Z2 by at least the percentage 82(l-82)/2, the customer will 
achieve greater profits by continuing to hold the shares than by divesting them. 
Otherwise the customer achieves greater profits by divesting. 
Proof. Denote firm 2's initial shareholdings by 8%, and its post share-trading 
holdings by 82. From the lemma and equation (3), if firm 1 holds no shares then the 
portion of the value of firm 2 dependent on trade with 1 is n2=Z2+8%Z2, and from 
equation (4) Nash bargaining assures that 
Now where z2 and z^ denote the values of the firms' trade-dependent operating earnings 
streams when 82=09 and z2 and z2 denote the values of the firms' trade-dependent 
operating earnings streams when 82>8°2, then the difference in the value of firm 2 of 
its continuing to hold the 8% shares versus completely divesting is 
which is greater than zero only if 
Proposition 2 enables us to characterize the equilibrium level of cross-
shareholding in this example. The customer will either (a.) hold a share interest 52 
that just causes the gain to cheating by the supplier (equation (8)) to be zero, or 
(b.) a zero share interest if (i.) there does not exist a positive share interest that 
is just sufficient to deter cheating or if (ii.), as described by Proposition 2, the 
firm would gain more by divesting such a share interest than by maintaining it. That 
is, 
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As defined, S represents the one-time myopic gain from opportunism relative to the 
present value of combined trade-dependent earnings of the two firms, and Y represents 
the percentage reduction in combined trade-dependent earnings if investment choices 
are myopic rather than Pareto optimal. If y is very large relative to S then the gain 
to cheating is negative even without cross-shareholding, and so S2=0. And if B is 
very large relative to y then the potential gains from any contract-enforcing property 
of cross-shareholding are insufficient to warrant cross-shareholding. Small levels of 
cross-shareholding would necessarily have a sort of knife edge character if y and 8 
both were large, the threat of divestiture subtracting a relatively small but 
nevertheless decisive amount from the gains to cheating. Thus we arrive at the 
conclusion that small levels of cross-shareholding are likely to arise only for 
commensurately small values of y and 6. The table 1 identifies the equilibrium level 
of cross-shareholding for selected illustrative values of these parameters. For 
example if y=5% and 6=2%, then 52=1.3%. 
In the literature on transaction cost economics, underinvestment by the supplier 
as in the above example is referred to as the quality assurance problem. Klein and 
Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) have argued that in a competitive market, a price 
premium can bond the supplier to maintain quality. In a bilateral monopoly, cross-
shareholding establishes exactly such a price premium, one contingent on the 
supplier's maintaining product quality. 
The case of the customer's hidden actions affecting the supplier's costs is 
perfectly symmetric to and is analytically the same as the quality assurance 
problem.5 
5Suppose that the cost of supplying the product depends upon some investment made 
by the customer c(I2), c'<0, c">0. The Pareto optimal level of investment maximizes 
v-c-I2, or is I2=I2|c'=-l. If the customer is assured of paying a set price its myopic 
choice is to not invest at all. As in the previous case, cross-shareholding, in this 
instance the supplier holding stock in the customer, may be crucial in deterring such 
opportunistic behavior. 
The case in which the value of the product to the customer depends upon investment 
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3. Keiretsu cross-shareholding. 
3.1 analytic approach. 
The purpose of this section is to describe the sorts of evidence that might 
indicate that the keiretsu shareholding links are intended to deter opportunism in the 
manner detailed above. As the examples developed in the previous section illustrate, 
a firm may hold a partial equity interest in a trading partner to strengthen its 
ability to penalize the trading partner for behaving opportunistically, and induce the 
rational expectation that it will in fact not behave opportunistically. If 
shareholding links are maintained to deter opportunism then several indications will 
exist. 
First, it is fairly obvious that shareholding which deters opportunism should 
link trading partners. Perhaps less obviously, simple portfolio investment will 
exclude equity positions in trading partners, according to Propositions 1 and 2. 
Persistent share links between trading partners must somehow augment whatever rents 
that the trade generates. 
Second, shareholding that deters opportunism should be greater the larger are the 
immediate gains from opportunistic behavior. If the trading partner is a supplier, 
its opportunism would entail substitution of products or services having inferior 
quality to what is claimed. If the trading partner is a customer, its opportunism 
would entail misrepresenting its own actions that affect the supplier's costs. In 
each instance opportunism enables the firm to avoid investing in transaction specific 
assets. The immediate gain to behaving opportunistically is larger the greater are 
such investments and the less detectable or verifiable are such investments. 
Third, shareholding that deters opportunism should be greater the smaller are the 
by the supplier and the supplier's costs also depend upon investment by the customer is 
only slightly more complex. As in the simpler cases, cross-shareholding by either party 
lowers the gain of the other from claiming to have made a Pareto optimal investment but 
in fact making no investment. Deception by either results in complete divestiture by the 
other. 
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future penalties for behaving opportunistically that do not depend upon cross-
shareholding. The main such penalty is damage to reputation with the trading partner 
affecting profits on future transactions with it (Malfeasance will not damage 
reputations with third parties for it is not detectable by them). Where growth in 
trade is expected or the profit from each trade is larger, the prospect of damage to 
reputation with the trading partner is itself a larger deterrent to opportunism and 
cross-shareholding need not be as great. (In terms of the algebraic example, as Zx+Z2 
is greater, B becomes smaller, and 52 tends to becomes less). 
Not one of the various factors related to cross-shareholding that is to deter 
opportunism is directly observable for keiretsu firms, but serviceable proxies exist 
for some of them. 
3.2 data. 
The six financial keiretsu that are the focus of this study are the modern 
counterparts of the pre-war zaibatsu. The zaibatsu were groups of companies in 
differing industries linked by shareholding ties, and largely controlled by the 
wealthy families who held majority interests in the respective zaibatsu holding 
companies. The American occupation authorities dissolved the zaibatsu shareholding 
ties and directed the enactment of antimonopoly statutes that have permanently 
abolished holding companies in Japan. The perhaps misguided purpose of the zaibatsu 
dissolution was retribution and punishment of the wealthy captains of industry in 
Japan during the years of fascism, expansion, and war. The principle effect of 
zaibatsu dissolution was the expropriation and redistribution of wealth, not 
reallocation of resources. For shortly after the occupation ended and sovereignty was 
restored to Japan the firms that had once belonged to the respective zaibatsu reformed 
their old alliances, reestablishing the shareholding ties that the Americans had 
forcibly dissolved (Hadley, 1970; pp. 205-256). The firms that are members of the 
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Mitsui keiretsu include many that were core members of the Mitsui zaibatsu. The 
members of the Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Fuyo keiretsu include many that were members 
of the Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda zaibatsu respectively. The Dai-Ichi Kangyo 
keiretsu includes firms that once belonged to the Furukawa and Kawasaki zaibatsu. 
Only the Sanwa keiretsu group has no zaibatsu antecedent. The renewal of group 
affiliations that had existed before the war is evidence that the firms in question 
had accumulated transaction specific assets. For had they not accumulated such 
assets, there would have been no particular advantage in renewing old alliances rather 
than establishing new ones. Here is one indication that the shareholding ties 
linking these firms over the years have promoted investment in transaction specific 
assets. This presumes that the firms have had important trading ties with one another 
which is indeed the case. 
A Japan Fair Trade Commission survey of the trading patterns among presidents' 
club members in 1981 (Kosei Torihiki Iinkai, 1983, Table 7, p. 24) found that 20% of 
the sales transactions of manufacturing firms in the respective clubs in excess of one 
million yen were to fellow members of the same clubs. And 12% of purchase 
transactions in excess of one million yen by these manufacturing firms were from 
fellow members. Of course transactions may have been outside the presidents' club but 
still within the same keiretsu defined more broadly to include affiliates and 
subsidiaries of the respective presidents7 club members. This evidence does indicate 
that there are significant trading ties among presidents' club members. 
To further explore the purposes of keiretsu shareholding ties I have compiled 
data on these same member firms of the six respective "presidents' clubs" of the major 
keiretsu: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi Kangyo. The 
presidents' clubs are rosters of firms represented at monthly meetings of the senior 
executives of the largest firms closely affiliated with the six respective keiretsu. 
In all, these include about 150 nonfinancial companies, most of the largest ones in 
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Japan. In 1980 all together these companies comprised about a seventh of all 
nonfinancial corporations7 assets in Japan. Keiretsu firms are linked by complex webs 
of interlocking shareholding. For data on shareholding ties I have relied upon the 
annual: kiqyo keiretsu soran, published by toyo keizai. The average fractions of 
outstanding shares held within the respective presidents7 clubs in 1980 were: 
Sumitomo (27%), Mitsubishi (29%), Dai-Ichi Kangyo (14%), Sanwa (17%), Mitsui (17%), 
Fuyo (16%), but about half of these shares were held by financial institutions of the 
respective groups. Typically the share interest of any one company in another was in 
a range of 3% or less. 
If indeed the purpose of keiretsu share interlocks is to deter opportunism then 
the share linkages ought to have influenced the pattern of trade among such firms. 
There is some indication that they have. Among the frequent complaints of foreigners 
attempting to do business in Japan is that keiretsu firms remain intractably loyal to 
fellow members of their same keiretsu even when outsiders offer products or services 
on superior terms. Lawrence (1991) finds that keiretsu sales as a fraction of 
industry sales are inversely related to the proportion of industry demand that is 
filled by imports, which is evidence that keiretsu ties between firms, which usually 
include shareholding ties, dispose firms to purchase from one another rather than from 
outsiders. In the logic detailed above, keiretsu firms may indeed be paying higher 
prices when buying from the firms in which they hold small share interests. As argued 
here, the willingness of a keiretsu firm to pay such an inflated price is based on the 
superior incentives that the implied profit premium confers on the trading partner. 
It is not based on naked chauvinism, cultural dispositions, or attenuated profit 
motives. 
To investigate whether keiretsu shareholding ties link firms that are trading 
partners as my theory would predict I have accumulated further data. The precise 
transactions between specific keiretsu companies are not publicly reported. Therefore 
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as proxies for the firm-level structure of transactions I rely on the 28 sector input-
output table of the Japanese economy to construct the industry-wide fractions of 
purchases of intermediate inputs that are from each industry. That is the input-
output coefficients--percentages of one industry's purchases that are from each 
respective industry--proxy the likelihood that any pair of fellow presidents7 club 
members in the corresponding industries are trading partners. In using these data in 
this way one peculiarity must be noted. The input-output coefficients linking each 
industry to itself are rather large, which mainly reflects transactions with 
subcontractors and other smaller firms as opposed to transactions with other large 
firms such as those likely to be members of a keiretsu presidents7 club. In the 
regression analysis which follows I have controlled for this distortion by introducing 
a separate variable P s a m e which equals the percentage of an industry's purchases that 
are from itself for each pair of fellow presidents7 club member firms in a same 
industry, and equals zero if the firms are not in a same industry. 
As already described the greater the expected growth in trade the less need be 
the shareholding ties if the purpose of the shareholding is to deter opportunism. 
Towards the end of the 1960s the members of the keiretsu significantly deepened their 
shareholding interlocks which is consistent with this prediction. The growth rate of 
Japan's economy had for the two decades previous to that been at an unsustainably high 
level. Expectation of reduced future profits from trading relationships had become 
rational by 1970. Other commentators have interpreted the deepening of keiretsu 
shareholding interlocks at this time as an attempt to strengthen takeover defenses in 
response to the liberalization of regulations pertaining to inward direct foreign 
investment in Japan (Aoki, 1988, p. 127; Ito, 1992, p. 191-2). The arguments of this 
paper afford an alternative interpretation of the same event. To further investigate 
the relation between expected growth in trade and cross-shareholding, I have collected 
data on the growth rate in each target firm's assets in the three years subsequent to 
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observation of the cross-shareholding. 
Damage to reputation with the trading partner is also likely to be more costly 
and reliance on cross-shareholding to deter opportunism correspondingly less, the 
greater the ongoing stream of profits associated with trade. Because of the relation 
between elasticity of demand and profit margins this means that the less elastic the 
demand for the final products the less need be the level of cross-shareholding. As a 
proxy for elasticity of demand I use expenditures on advertising relative to sales. A 
simple basis for this is the Dorfman-Steiner condition which holds that advertising 
divided by sales is inversely proportional to price elasticity.6 
A glossary of variables and their means for the sample firms are to be found in 
Table 2. The ADV/SALES, and LNSALES variables are averages over the three years 1979-
81. GTA. is averaged over the three years 1981-83. The 6. ., P. ., and P.. variables 
are observed in the one year 1980. There are 147 different firms in the sample, the 
nonfinancial members of the presidents' clubs of the six keiretsu in 1980. But the 
units of observation are ordered pairs of differing firms that are both members of a 
same club. There are 4216 such observations. For 909 of these ordered pairs, the 
first firm holds stock in the second. Because our focus is on small shareholding 
links only we exclude from the sample the instances of cross-shareholding in excess of 
ten percent; there were 16 such instances. This leaves 4200 observations. There are 
296 instances of reciprocal cross-shareholding (accounting for 592 of the 893 
instances of cross-shareholding of ten percent or less). 
3.3. regression results. 
Maximum likelihood estimates of Tobit regression models for explaining 
shareholding by each firm i in other members of its same keiretsu presidents' club in 
1980 are presented in Table 3. The Tobit model is 
6See Tirole (1989), p. 103, for a discussion of the Dorfman-Steiner condition. 
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where X is the vector of values of explanatory variables k=l,...K, and £~N(o,o2). For 
each variable the table reports estimates of 8k and asymptotic t-statistic for 
hypothesis Bk=0.7 I used the software known as Shazam to compute these estimates. 
Estimates of the marginal effect of each variable k on the expected level of cross-
shareholding evaluated at the sample mean, 3E(51J|6iJ)/dXk, may be obtained as 
Bk5u/6> the regression coefficient times the mean of the dependent variable divided 
by the standard error of the estimate. Several results merit comment. 
First, the pattern of cross-shareholding within the keiretsu presidents' clubs 
somewhat mirrors the structure of transactions. That is, fellow presidents' club 
member firms which by virtue of the industries to which they belong are likely to have 
trading ties ( P ^ is large or P^^ is large) are more likely to have share linkages. 
This is consistent with the thesis that the cross-shareholding is to forestall 
opportunism and is inconsistent with its being exclusively portfolio investment. 
Second, presidents' club firms that advertise more intensely, indicating that 
their production activity is generating a stream of profits, tend to be linked to one 
another by smaller share interests (as shown by the negative coefficients on 
ADV/SALES. and ADV/SALES-). Where trade is generating profits, damage to reputation 
with the trading partner is likely to itself be a greater deterrent to opportunism and 
cross-shareholding need not be as great. Alternatively, advertising intensity might 
be least for firms whose customers are industrial firms rather than consumers, and 
cross-shareholding be more likely to link such firms, either because they are more 
likely to have trading ties or their trading ties are more likely to elicit 
7If heteroskedasticity is present these estimates are inconsistent. However 
Arabmazar and Schmidt (1981) argue that the inconsistency may be small and in any case 
is less in the censored model here than in a truncated model that discards the 
observations with zero cross-shareholding. 
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transaction specific investments. 
Third, there is perhaps only a slight tendency for firms to hold smaller share 
interests in fellow presidents7 club members that are growing more rapidly (as shown 
by the negative though insignificant coefficient on GTAJ. Where trade between firms 
j 
is expected to grow, the future loss of profits resulting from damage to reputation 
with the trading partner is greater, and other safeguards against opportunism 
including cross-shareholding need not be as intense. But these results offer weak 
confirmation only. 
Finally, cross-shareholding tends to link the larger firms in the sample, not the 
smaller ones. I have no ready explanation for this. Perhaps scale effects are 
present in the data which the statistical model or economic model has done a poor job 
of capturing. 
5. Conclusion 
The voluminous literature on Japan's contemporary business groups has produced 
several theories including the anti-takeover theory, externality theory, and 
successive monopoly theory. None of the theories is a completely satisfactory 
explanation for the shareholding interlocks that connect the nonfinancial members of 
the respective keiretsu. This has led some commentators to describe the shareholding 
ties between these large firms as "symbolic" only, not rational in the narrow sense. 
I have proposed an alternate solution to the keiretsu puzzle: The keiretsu 
shareholding interlocks are to deter opportunism. A firm that holds an equity 
interest in a trading partner weakens its own bargaining position with regard to the 
product transactions but precisely for this reason is capable at any time of 
penalizing the partner by unilaterally divesting. In this manner cross-shareholding 
can be to strengthen the penalties for behaving opportunistically and induce a 
rational expectation that the other party will in fact not behave opportunistically. 
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Opportunism by a supplier would entail substitution of products or services having 
inferior quality to what is claimed. Opportunism by a customer would entail 
misrepresenting its own investments that reduce the supplier's costs, 
Cross-shareholding that is to deter opportunism in the manner detailed here would 
link trading partners, and would tend to be smaller if growth in trade is expected or 
if each trade confers greater rent. The pattern of cross-shareholding among fellow 
presidents' club members of the six financial keiretsu exhibits all the 
characteristics just mentioned. 
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